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8. Short and medium term fiscal sustainability in Poland in comparison 




Nowadays, sustainability and sustainable growth are an often mentioned concept. In connection with 
the financial crisis, the budget and fiscal policy sustainability has been the forefront of research. This 
study took its advice and follows a simple intertemporal budget constraint and calculate primary gap 
in some selected years (2004, 2009, 2014) and testing assumptions for short-term and medium term 
selected periods (2000–2004, 2005–2009, 2010–2014) in Poland in comparison with the Visegrad 
Group Countries. 
Result of examination is fiscal stance of V4 countries was varied. Based on most of estimated 
results the short-term fiscal policy stances of V4 seem to be unsustainable, but in medium-term seem 
to be sustainable particularly in Poland. Poland has good results thanks to continuous economic 
growth, stable and renewable fiscal policy and large domestic market. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Nowadays, sustainability and sustainable growth are an often mentioned together. In 
connection with the financial crisis, the budgetary and fiscal policy sustainability has been the 
forefront of research. Based on the definition of fiscal sustainability is very difficult to 
understand. The study used a boarder scope in understanding this concept: “concept of fiscal 
sustainability relates to a government's ability to indefinitely maintain the same set of policies 
while remaining solvent” (Burnstein 2005, p. 10). 
Poland is a member of the Visegrad Group (V4). Visegrad Group Countries means 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. Declaration on Cooperation between the 
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Republic of Poland and the Republic of Hungary in 
Striving for European Integration signed in Visegrad on 15 February 1991. Visegrad Group is 
more homogenous group than European Union. V4 have been sharing traditional and 
intellectual values and common roots, so they are good benchmark of public finance 
sustainability too. 
Aristovnik and Berčič (2007) examined transition economies with a specific 
intertemporal budget constraint, whereas their results indicate that fiscal sustainability seems 
to be a problem in many transition countries, for example Poland. The study follows this 
methodology with some modifications. Present paper revolves around the specialties of 
Short and Medium Term Fiscal Sustainability in Poland in Comparison with the V4 Group 129 
 
intertemporal budget constraint and underlines the most important elements of long run fiscal 
sustainability in terms of pension payment obligations and health care outlays for the elderly 
which are consequences of the aging population and the lower fertility rate (Orban − Szapary 
2004, McHugh et al. 2011).  
The paper is organized as follows: chapter 2 gives a theoretical background where 
literature about fiscal sustainability is summarized and examine some macroeconomic 
connection factors in Poland with comparison in Visegrad Group Countries are examined. 
Chapter 3 deals with the methods of the empirical examination of the current study. Chapter 4 
includes data and results by empirical examination and the last chapter 5 constitutes the 
conclusion. 
 
2. Theoretical background 
 
The literature defining to the concept of fiscal sustainability multiple point of view. The 
first approach for fiscal sustainability threshold defining by Buitler (1985) or Blanchard 
(1990). They said that the fiscal policy is sustainable if debt to GDP ratio is stable. Stable 
means long run stability. The following summarize that some author's claim on the subject. 
 
2.1. General about fiscal sustainability 
 
Barro (1979) examines empirical data for the U.S, and finds that a positive effect on 
debt issue of temporary increases in government spending (as in wartime) and a 
countercyclical response of debt to temporary income movements, and a one-to-one effect of 
expected inflation on nominal debt growth. 
Bohn (1998) defined a new intertemporal budget constraint in U.S. fiscal data, and 
shows that an estimated positive response of primary surpluses to the debt/GDP ratio. 
Demonstrated that the frequent primary budget deficits do not provide convincing evidence 
against sustainability, because at low interest rates, a variety of sustainable policies will 
display primary deficits on average and potentially for long periods.  
According to the European Commission’s Fiscal Sustainability Report “sustainability of 
fiscal policies is the ability to continue now and in the future, current policies without change 
regarding public services and taxation, without causing the debt to rise continuously as a 
share to GDP” (EC 2012, p. 17). In Euro Zone, fiscal sustainability threshold is defined debt 
to GDP ratio of 60% by Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), but after the financial crisis the 
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average of debt ratio is much higher than 60% and continued the growth, 92.1% in 2014 
based on Eurostat (2016). 
Menguy (2008) draws attention the fact on the disadvantages of SGP due to its nature 
that it focuses on a uniform short-term criterion for the budgetary situation of the European 
countries (i.e. the current budgetary deficit) rather than on the long run solvability of 
aforementioned countries. So he suggests a new budgetary rule, that taking into account the 
long run sustainability of the public indebtedness and encouraging EU countries to lead 
healthy budgetary policies in good times in order to secure more leeway in bad times, instead 
of inefficient and pro-cyclical policies. 
According to Cottarreli and Moghadam (2011) the anchor for fiscal policy of 60 percent 
of GDP is relatively close to the most recent estimates of long-run debt levels for both 
advanced economies and emerging economies. However, they declares that it should not be 
stick to this reference value, researchers should look at a variety of special circumstances and 
based on their information to assess the fiscal sustainability of a country. 
 
2.2. Macroeconomic background in V4 
 
V4 countries defined transition economies
1
 too, became independent in 1989/1990 for 
Soviet Union and begun a long transition process what means liberalization, macroeconomic 
stabilization, restructuring and privatization and legal and institutional reforms (IMF 2000). 
Their deep changes are much more difficult and time-consuming because they involved 
structural reforms and require a major modification of attitudes, incentives, and relationships 
(Tanzi 1999). Advantages of post socialist economic change in V4 have greater independence 
from political control, the enhanced well-being of consumers through better-quality and easier 
access to goods and services.  
Disadvantages of transition have decline in the sense of economic security, the end of 
full employment and increased social inequalities (Domański 2003). Policymakers must face 
large fiscal deficits and macroeconomic problem, theirs became a more fundamental problem 
when governments to renege on their legal contracts by sequestering or freezing payments 
across the board (Tanzi 1999). Social safety net in helping overcome political constraints is 
                                                 
1 
Transition economies in Europe and the former Soviet Union: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
FYR Macedonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,  Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Transition economies in Asia: Cambodia, China, Laos, and Vietnam (IMF 2000). 
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quiet clear and has helped mitigate negative effect of income inequality in Poland and the 
Czech Republic (Roland 2002). 
Transition meant a unique opportunity for these countries to put down an anchor in 
Western Europe (Roland 2002). Aspirations of the V4 countries that adopted tight fiscal 
policies were more successful with their inflation stabilization programs, have experienced a 
faster recovery of growth, and did not experience a steeper decline in output. Countries 
floated their exchange rate, but there were both floating and peg arrangements among the 
successful stabilizers (Budina – Van Wijnbergen 1997). V4 joined to European Union in 
2004. 
Visegrad countries in the first decade of EU membership were divided into three parts 
by Vida (2015). The post-accession and pre-crisis years (2004–2008) when macroeconomic 
trends improved mostly but diverging degrees except Hungary where deteriorated. The crisis 
years (2009–2013) meant stagnation or low growth, recession, gradual recovery and slow 
consolidation. Hungarian public finances were became extremely vulnerable because of crisis 
and previously misguided fiscal policy, thus Hungary had to start fiscal stabilization earlier 
than the other three countries. Finally the post-crisis years (2014 and beyond) characterized 
by harmonious converging trends to each other and EU averages. 
The stabilizing public finance trends are coupled with stabilizing monetary trends too. 
Thanks to a mix of measures aiming at spreading the burdens across all the actors of the 
economy, Hungary could be released from the excessive deficit procedure in 2013, the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia followed it in 2014 and Poland in 2015 (EC 2016). In all four countries 
seem to keep budget deficits under 3% also in the medium run. Simultaneously, public debts 
are slowly declining in high-rate Hungary while are kept below 60% of GDP in the other 
three Visegrad countries (Vida 2015). 
Despite the success of the transition process some differences between old and new 
members of European Union remained the same. Orban – Szapary (2004) focus on new 
members
2 
and SGP criterions and emphasize that there are large differences in the starting 
fiscal positions of the new members.  
Figure 1 shows government debt data in V4 countries and European Union and 
European Union (EU) 15 countries
3 
(EU-15) averages. No more difference between two EU 
averages, all EU averages are a little bit lower than EU-15 averages, data available until 2000. 
                                                 
2
 New members means countries who joined to European Union in 2004: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia. 
3
 EU 15 countries means Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
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The highest data have for Hungary from V4 countries, but in period 2000–2005, debt of V4 
countries were under the EU averages, this during this period, transition economies’ 
convergence became stronger (Veugelers – Mrak 2009). After crisis trends of debt was 
increased and reach a peak in 2010 in Hungary and in 2013 in other V4 countries. In EU was 
not stopped increase of debt until 2014. 
 
Figure 1 General government consolidated gross debt in V4 countries and European Union, 
1996-2017 (Percentage of GDP) 
 
Source: AMECO (2016) 
 
In this paper the focus is especially on intertemporal budget constraint in short and 
medium term, but also underlines the most important elements of long run fiscal 
sustainability, which are pension payment obligations and health care outlays for the elderly 
due to population ageing and the current fertility rate (Orban – Szapary 2004, McHugh et al. 
2011). Furthermore, fiscal policies have been driven by political factors, this connection is 
examined for example by Roubini and Sachs (1989), Alesina et al. (1996), Wyplosz (2007),  
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Mauro et al. (2015). During the last decade fiscal councils
4
 were established in some 
countries, for example in Hungary and in Slovakia, but due to space limitations, we do not 
deal with this in the current study. 
 
2.3. Macroeconomic background in Poland 
 
Poland's transition path is named "success stories". This partly thanks to have powerful 
social networks, including the Catholic Church and the Solidarity trade union. At the 
beginning of transition real GDP was fallen of about 20 percent in the two years after price 
liberalization started in 1989, but recovered growth rather quickly and exceeded its 
pretransition real GDP level after six or seven years of transition (Roland 2002). 
In 1990s has been a dark side of transition that regional differentiation has deepened: 
opportunities are not equal for everyone and do not emerge everywhere. There is a variety of 
historically rooted regional and local trajectories within the country. Indicates the extensive 
spread of growth within broad metropolitan areas. GDP per capita represented about 22 
percent for the EU average (at purchasing-power standards) in 1990, and 10 years later no 
more than 40 percent. Poland’s share in world exports remains low and the trade balance 
negative (Domanski 2003). If we show data of economic growth for the past 20 years, 
conclude continuous lifting what thanks to increasing labor productivity and inflow FDI. 
Poland has attained living standards never seen before. (Zimny 2015). 
When Poland entered the European Union deficit was higher than reference value of 3% of 
GDP, therefore European Commission recommended the Council launch the excessive deficit 
procedure. The government has done everything to reduce the deficit, the efforts proved 
successful, deficit was 6.3% in 2003 and decreased to 2% in 2007. Economic growth was 
slowed by crisis. In 2009 the deficit exceeded threshold (Kawecka-Wyrzykowska 2015). In 
2015 July Council abolished excessive deficit process (EC 2016).  
Poland was the only EU country to avoid recession in 2009 and to record relatively 
good economic indicators (relatively good economic management, inflow of EU funds, 
flexible domestic currency and a large domestic market) and fiscal stability excluded deficit, 
which was in contrast to other EU members’ deep instability. Government introduced reform 
                                                 
4
 Fiscal council “stands for such a new, smaller or bigger body (consisting of a minimum of three members but 
could incorporate as many as two dozen) the members of which are people of high professional prestige who are 
independent from the government or the national assembly, operating with a background of analytical capacities 
that enable them to prepare alternative evaluations, forecasts or technical projections versus the 
macroeconomic calculations and forecasts of the government and, thanks to their respect, are also able to assert 
their opinions" (Kovacs 2014, p. 338) 
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pack, established Open Pension Funds (OFE), which will result in a substantial one-off 
improvement (surplus) in the Polish budget in 2014. Another new element is a proposal for a 
Tax Council which contributes to maintaining fiscal stability. The government joint to 
European Semesters, the Euro-Plus Pact and the Fiscal Compact, so that strengthen economic 
governance and reduce the risk of a future crisis (Kawecka-Wyrzykowska 2015). 
Wójtowicz (2015) draw attention the local budgets became dependent on external 
transfers from the state budget and this connection may be a menace to the fiscal 
sustainability of local authorities. System of state grants and subsidies are not flexible and 
react very strongly to economic fluctuations. Local authorities have very limited fiscal 
autonomy which constrict their instruments to stimulate future economic growth. This 




According to Wyplosz (2007) we could not apply sophisticated forecasting methods, 
because sustainability depend on the future so we could not draft a statement with high 
security about primary surpluses. Solvency, and therefore sustainability as it builds upon 
solvency, is entirely forward-looking. There are future balances that matter, not the past and 
not just the current debt level. Based on the difficult and sophisticated models’ needs huge 
data demands so the paper to focus on clear and simple indices, what easily interpreted, 
suggested by Blanchard et al. (1990) and Cruz-Rodríguez (2014). 
Indicators for measuring fiscal sustainability are very different. One of the traditional 
indicators is debt to GDP ratio, it has been used Buiter (1985) and Blanchard (1990), Fatas 
and Mihov (2008), and nowadays D'Erasmo (2015). Blanchard calculates the "tax gap", which 
is the change in the tax ratio that would be necessary to stabilize the current debt-to-GDP 
ratio. Barta (2015) emphasizes that ‘tax gap’ is not equal to a primary gap, because primary 
gap given the current interest and growth rates might still threaten solvency if interest rates 
rise and/or growth rates drop. Primary gap indicators provide a diagnosis that is easy to 
interpret, because they show how painful the adjustment would need to be to stabilize the debt 
today. 
Spaventa’s (1987) primary gap indicators impose a condition that is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for the sustainability of fiscal policies. A country will have a sustainable fiscal 
regime if current and future primary balances, interest rates, and growth rates, are such that 
the government's intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied (Drudi – Pratti 2000). 
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The tax gaps indices, are based on a comparison of the current debt-GDP ratio and that 
n periods ahead with given fixed values of the deficit and discount rate (Polito – Wickens 
2012). 
More recently, the European Commission (2006) has formulated two fiscal indicators: 
S1 and S2. Both are based on official projections of government expenditure what include the 
effects of population ageing. The S1 indicator comprise just the Maastricht condition what 
maximum debt should be 60% of GDP, while the S2 indicator requires that the government 
inter-temporal budget constraint be satisfied over an infinite horizon. European Commission 
(2009, 2012) modified S1 and S2 indicators methods, that to further promote sustainability 
measurement. 
Aristovnik and Berčič (2007) examined transition economies with a specific 
intertemporal budget constraint. The study follow this methodology with some modification. 
The reason for changes that my paper not examine long-term sustainability, because there are 
too many uncertain factors in this time horizon and their enumeration exceeds length limit. 
Criterion is related to so called fiscal primary gap, which is the difference between the 
actual fiscal primary balance and the primary balance required to stabilize the debt to GDP 
ratio. Simple accounting identity helps shed light on the fiscal sustainability issue (Aristovnik 
– Berčič 2007). 
According to Geithner (2002) solvency is only necessary not sufficient assumption 
fiscal sustainability but a non-increasing government debt to GDP ratio is seen as a practical 
sufficient condition for sustainability, because a government is likely to remain solvent as 
long as the ratio is not growing. Hemming and MacKenzie (1991) the (short-term) budget 
constraint is: 
 
  (1) 
 
where Dt is total public debt, Yt nominal GDP, rt represents the real interest rate  and gt the 
real economic growth rate, Bt is nominal primary (negative) balance of the public sector, in 
study empirical means the gap between non-interest expenditure and total revenue and Rt 
residual factor. When rt > gt this indicated upward pressure on the debt/GDP ratio, while rt < 
gt indicates downward pressure. The remaining part of the right-hand area indicates non-
interest flows of government. If it is negative, government runs a primary surplus, implying 
downward pressure on the debt/GDP ratio. If it is positive, government runs a primary deficit, 
putting upward pressure on the debt/GDP ratio (Aristovnik – Berčič 2007, p. 6). 
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If the debt/GDP ratio depends on the relationship between the interest rate (r), and the 
economic growth rate (g), we can use (2) and (3) formula.  
First can be presented as if g > r: 
 
  (2) 
 
Second as if r > g: 
 
  (3) 
 
where b=Bt/Yt is primary deficit a constant ratio of GDP, the overall public 
deficit ratio is not constant. 
The sustainable primary surplus, which can be presented as 
 
  (4) 
 
Sustainable primary surplus, which can be presented as 
 
  (5) 
 
Although this study did not calculate, but can measure the long-term tax gaps 
(Blanchard, 1990) and the sustainable conventional public balance needs alternative indicator, 
which sustainable budget deficit (GOVBt) is derived from equation (5) and equals the growth 




As alternative the medium-term tax gap (t*n – t) can be taken, where the real interest 
rate, real economic growth rate and the projected path of no-interest expenditure are taken as 
given. In this respect, the required tax rate necessary to stabilize the debt/GDP ratio is as 
follows (Blanchard, 1990): 
 
  (7) 
 
where exp, trf and n state for government expenditure, transfers (both as a ratio to GDP), and 
the numbers of years over which govexp and trf are incurred, respectively. However, equation 
(7) holds if the values of n and (r – g) are not large. 
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4. Data and results 
 
First, we estimate public finance sustainability for V4 economies, Czech Republic 
(CZE), Hungary (HUN), Poland (POL), and Slovakia (SVK). For short-term examination for 
the chosen three years: 2004, 2009, and 2014 for medium-term used the average of 5 years 
(2000–2004, 2005–2009, 2010–2014). Source all of data were from the AMECO (2016) 
database. Examination was built on the following key variables:  
− the equilibrium level of public debt (D/Y) with nominal data, alternatively, it is assumed 
for all sampled economies that governments are comfortable tolerating a debt ratio of 60 
percent (D/Y*);  
− for short-term used the nominal interest rate (i) and nominal (gn) growth; 
− for medium-term used the real interest rate (r) and public debt (D/Y) and growth rate of 
real GDP (g).  
The results of examination summarize below (Table 1 and Table 2). 
 
Table 1 Short-term fiscal sustainability in V4 countries, 2004, 2009, 2014 (Percentage) 
    
Calculated (short-
term) primary public 
balance  
((i-gn)/(1+gn))*(D/Y) 





































 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
2004                 
CZE 28.5 9.2 4.8 –1.1 –2.4 –1.6 –0.5 0.7 
HUN 58.5 10.2 8.2 –1.1 –1.1 –2.0 –0.9 –0.9 
POL 45.3 9.6 6.9 –1.1 –1.5 –2.4 –1.3 –0.9 
SVK 40.6 11.3 5.0 –2.3 –3.4 –0.2 2.1 3.2 
2009                 
CZE 34.1 –2.3 4.8 2.5 4.4 –4.3 –6.8 –8.7 
HUN 78.0 –2.9 9.1 9.6 7.4 –0.1 –9.7 –7.5 
POL 49.8 6.6 6.1 –0.2 –0.3 –4.8 –4.6 –4.6 
SVK 36.0 –6.6 4.7 4.4 7.3 –6.4 –10.8 –13.7 
2014                 
CZE 42.7 4.5 1.6 –1.2 –1.7 –0.6 0.6 1.1 
HUN 76.2 7.0 4.8 –1.6 –1.2 1.5 3.1 2.7 
POL 50.4 3.8 3.5 –0.1 –0.2 –1.4 –1.3 –1.2 
SVK 53.5 2.3 2.1 –0.1 –0.2 –0.9 –0.8 –0.8 
Source: own construction 
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In Table 1, the first three columns (1-3) show the relevant magnitudes (public debt/GDP 
ratio, nominal rate of growth, and nominal interest rate for V4) for the calculation of 
sustainable level of primary public balance. Thus, column 4 and 5 show the computation of 
equation (2). Columns 7 and 8 show the gap between the corresponding calculated (columns 4 
and 5) and actual primary fiscal balance (column 6). Since each year’s deficit goes to increase 
the outstanding public debt, the higher is the (positive) gap between actual fiscal deficit and 
hypothetical fiscal deficit, the higher the speed at which the public debt decreases (Aristovnik 
– Berčič 2007). 
In 2004 actual and calculated sustainable fiscal levels seem to be the same in Hungary 
and Poland. On the other hand, if we take into considerations the targeted public debt (60 
percent of GDP), the calculated (permitted) average fiscal deficit is relatively higher and the 
gap between the actual and the calculated deficit amounts to 0,9 percentage points in Poland 
and Hungary, but we can see that Czech Republic’s and Slovakia’s results in actual primary 
public balance is lower than targeted. The short-term fiscal policy stances of Hungary and 
Poland seem to be unsustainable. 
In 2009, one year after the global financial crises, nominal (and real) GDP growth of V4 
became negative, except for Poland, because it has a large domestic market. If we show real 
GDP growth rate data in Poland, it is increasing with 2.6% (AMECO 2016). Actual and the 
calculated public debt difference is high and the message that the countries engaged in 
unsustainable fiscal policies, but we expected similar outcome. If we show time series of real 
and nominal GDP growth, 2009 was the worst year. 
In 2014, five years after the global financial crises, nominal (and real too) GDP growth 
of V4 became positive. Public debt was high in Hungary, but the threshold (60 percent of 
GDP) was not crossed by the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia. In this year the short-
term fiscal policy stances of Poland and Slovakia seem to be unsustainable. 
Table 2 shows results of medium term. In Table 2, first three columns (1-3) show the 
relevant magnitudes (public debt/GDP ratio, real rate of growth, and real interest rate for V4) 
for the calculation of sustainable level of primary public balance (Columns 4-7). Column 8 
show the public debt forecast after five years and we could be in comparison with real data 
Column 9 shows real public debt after five years. And column 10 is shows public debt 
calculations by Aristovnik – Berčič (2007).  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
2000-
2004                      
CZE 24.5 3.5 1.8 –0.4 –1.0 –3.8 –3.4 51.2 34.1 43.7 
HUN 55.6 4.3 –0.2 –2.4 –2.6 –1.7 0.7 78.5 78.0 61.3 
POL 41.5 3.3 5.1 0.7 1.1 –1.9 –2.6 59.1 49.8 55.1 
SVK 44.6 3.9 0.7 –1.4 –1.9 –2.8 –1.4 45.4 36.0 52.8 
2005-
2009                     
CZE 29.3 3.3 2.4 –0.3 –0.6 –1.7 –1.4 49.7 42.7 – 
HUN 68.1 0.6 3.4 1.9 1.7 –1.8 –3.8 90.6 76.2 – 
POL 46.9 4.7 2.4 –1.0 –1.3 –1.9 –0.8 57.3 50.4 – 
SVK 31.8 5.2 2.7 –0.7 –1.4 –2.3 –1.6 52.5 53.5 – 
2010-
2014                     
CZE 42.1 1.0 2.1 0.5 0.7 –1.5 –2.0 46.3 – – 
HUN 78.5 1.3 3.7 1.9 1.5 0.9 –1.0 78.0 – – 
POL 53.6 3.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 –2.2 –2.2 52.5 – – 
SVK 48.8 2.7 2.9 0.1 0.1 –2.5 –2.6 60.7 – – 
Source: own construction based on Aristovnik and Berčič (2007) 
 
Based on 2000–2004 averages the five years forecasts of debt (Column 8) are higher 
than real data (Column 9) in Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland. Estimated values by 
Aristovnik – Berčič (2007) are higher than real values, too. Own calculation debt similar real 
debt in Hungary, Aristovnik – Berčič (2007) underestimated public debt in Hungary. 
Based on 2005–2009 averages the five years predictions of debt (Column 8) are 
underestimated real data (Column 9) in Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Estimation of 
Aristovnik – Berčič (2007) was finished in 2004 and not concerned this period so could not 
comprised results.  
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Based on 2009–2014 averages the five years estimations of debt (Column 8) are 
prognostic decrease in Poland, increase in Czech Republic and Slovakia. The deficit values 
became positive in this period. Results shows sustainable medium-term fiscal policy stance 
for V4. 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
In last years the financial crisis placed budgetary and fiscal policy sustainability on 
centre stage of researches, but defining of the fiscal sustainability is hard yet, because it 
depends on the horizon and many difference indicators. Researchers made and used more 
difficult models for examination of fiscal sustainability year by year, but newest studies 
according to the simplest models work best and give accurate forecasting results. This study 
took this advice and followed a simple intertemporal budget constraint and calculated primary 
gap in the selected years and periods and testing assumptions for short-term and analysed 
public debt at medium-term. Examination based on Poland and in comparison on three 
European countries: Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, who namely together Visegrad 
Group. 
Results of the examination shows that fiscal stance of V4 countries were varied. In 
short-term results Poland and Hungary seem to be unsustainable fiscal policy in 2004. In 
period 2000–2004, own calculation to debt similar real debt in Hungary, while Aristovnik and 
Berčič (2007) underestimated public debt in Hungary. 
In 2009, the effects to the global financial crisis in Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Slovakia too seem to be unsustainable, but Poland kept fiscal sustainability, thanks to its large 
internal market. In 2014, the threshold of public debt went under 60% of GDP in V4 countries 
except Hungary, but the short-term fiscal policy stance of Poland and Slovakia seem to be 
unsustainable. Based on results of medium-term sustainable medium-term fiscal policy stance 
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